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We look at the effect of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, taking into account the effect of 
underlying political conditions. We present a model where strong politics (defined as policymakers 
facing longer political horizon and higher cohesion) are associated with better fiscal performance, but 
fixed exchange rates may revert this result and lead to less fiscal discipline. We confirm these 
hypotheses through regression analysis performed on a panel sample covering 79 countries from 1975 
to 2012. Our empirical results also show that the positive effect of strong politics on fiscal discipline is 
not enough to counter the negative impact of being at/moving to fixed exchange rates. Our results are 
robust to a number of important sensitivity checks, including different estimators, alternative proxies 
for fiscal discipline, and sub-sample analysis.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The issue of what type of exchange rate regime is better for fiscal discipline has a long tradition in 
macroeconomics. Traditionally, the view that fixed exchange rate regimes could be associated with 
increased fiscal discipline was widely accepted. However, more recent theoretical models, together 
with mixed empirical evidence, have paved the way to an alternative policy view according to which 
flexible exchange rate regimes are also compatible with healthy public finances.2 In parallel, we have 
witnessed many countries moving from fixed to flexible exchange rates in the last two decades.3 On 
the economic front, two opposing views are at stake: the first considers a fixed peg as a provider of 
credible discipline and associates fixed exchange rates with enhanced fiscal restraint; the second 
defends that flexible rates induce better fiscal performance instead because they expose the costly 
economic consequences of fiscal profligacy and do not allow policy-makers to hide the deterioration 
of fiscal balances behind a loss of domestic reserves.  
 
The empirical evidence that examines the relationship between fiscal discipline and exchange rate 
regimes is mixed. Gavin and Perotti (1998) uncover an association between fixed-exchange rate 
regimes and public deficits in Latin American economies, but they don’t find similar evidence for 
developed, industrialized economies. Fatàs and Rose (2001) find that, while adherence to a common 
currency area is not associated with increased fiscal discipline, adoption of a currency boards is. Tornell 
and Velasco (1995, 1998) and Sun (2003) present evidence of the effects of fixed exchange rate regimes 
on fiscal discipline. Their evidence is limited to a specific set of countries – notably the CFA zone in 
Africa and the pegged currency union in the Caribbean. In sum, there are divergent empirical results 
as to the relationship between exchange rate regimes and fiscal discipline. 
 
In our view, these mixed findings stem from the fact that the literature has mostly neglected the 
importance of the political context in which fiscal policy decisions are made. On the political front, we 
propose that there are two dimensions affecting fiscal policy decisions that must be taken into account. 
First, the electoral calendar, which involves a clear timing dimension which directly impacts the policy 
maker’s horizon; and second, the degree of cohesion or political fragmentation that policy-makers 
enjoy - or not - within the government coalition structures or the legislature. In other words, 
considering the underlying political conditions - both in terms of electoral timing and political 
 
2 For instance, the 1990’s witnessed a series of crises in emerging market economies, as well as European countries 
under the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), that suggested financial openness, monetary independence, and pegs 
were incompatible. In the case of emerging economies, the experience suggested the only options were either strong 
currency pegs or floating exchange rate regimes. 
3 As reviewed in Bordo (2003), exchange rate regime choice evolved considerably over the last century. In the early 
twentieth century adopting the gold standard – and, thus, a hard peg, seemed the obvious policy choice, followed by 
most advanced economies. Today the policy choice became the opposite, though equally “obvious”. All developed 
economies, with the exception of Eurozone countries among themselves, have adopted flexible exchange rates. 
Developing countries, with some exceptions, seem more or less constrained to follow the prevailing policy view, and 
mimic – if not follow, developed countries actions.   
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cohesion - under which fiscal policy choices are made is crucial to properly understand how alternative 
exchange rate regimes interact with fiscal outcomes. In this paper, we examine the question of how 
politics affects the interaction between currency regime and fiscal discipline using the broadest 
possible sample yet available. 
 
Determining whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are better for enhanced fiscal discipline in the 
presence of different political conditions, is important for several reasons. First, the exchange rate 
regime may affect the incentives to use deficits with electoral motives (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1997), 
or limit the sustainability of fiscal adjustments (Lane and Perotti, 2003; and Lambertini and Tavares, 
2005). Second, if flexible exchange rates are associated with closer public scrutiny of policymakers and 
this in turn encourages fiscal discipline, shifting to a flexible regime may be a “low cost” institutional 
fix to a recurrent issue. This is particularly important in countries where credible economic and political 
institutions do not exist or incapable of monitoring fiscal authorities. A flexible exchange rate regime 
can in these cases be seen as a substitute, albeit imperfect, for the harder task of building better 
institutions. Third, as the experience of the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crises testifies, hard 
and credible pegs, even in advanced economies, are not necessarily associated with fiscal restraint. 
Here too, one of the determinants of the fiscal stance may be the quality of institutions ensuring 
accountability and transparency at the national level. Finally, many of the developing countries 
adopting fixed pegs are small open economies, vulnerable to considerable exogenous shocks, so that 
determining how internal politics affects the relationship between fixing the exchange rate and fiscal 
performance becomes a key issue.4  
 
Our results show that, in general, policy makers that take decisions under fixed exchange rate regimes 
are associated with less fiscal discipline. When political conditions are taken into account, strong 
political environments help improve fiscal discipline, especially under flexible exchange rate regimes. 
In other words, policy makers that don’t face immediate elections and who can operate without 
political fragmentation are associated with better fiscal performance, especially when they operate 
within a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature. Section III presents 
a generic model illustrating the mechanisms by which political conditions (in terms of political horizon 
and cohesion) affect the relationship between exchange rate regimes and fiscal discipline. Section IV 
describes the data and presents our main results. Section V provides several robustness exercises. 
Finally, section VI summarizes the main findings and concludes. 
  
 
4 Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006) explore the sample of small economies in the Caribbean, while Tornell and Velasco 
(1995) present evidence for the CFA Franc community in Africa. 
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II.   LITERATURE REVIEW: EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND FISCAL DISCIPLINE 
The Traditional Argument 
 
The traditional argument holds that fixed exchange rates encourage fiscal discipline. This argument is 
steeped in a long tradition, going back to at least a century ago5, according to which adhering to a 
specie standard, or a stable currency, would be associated with sound money and predictable policies 
that would keep inflation under control and lead to fiscal restraint. The idea is that lax fiscal policies 
could eventually lead to a collapse of the peg, which is a very costly scenario (Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1988; Frankel and others, 1991). This traditional argument emphasizes how anticipation of the harsh 
economic impact of defaulting from a fixed-exchange rate regime disciplines policymakers today and 
lead to sound fiscal policy.  
 
In most theoretical setups, the fiscal and monetary policymakers care for both government expenditure 
and inflation, either because they just do, or because there is some sort of fiscal dominance.6 The usual 
trade-off is in place, whereby larger government transfers today or tomorrow translate into higher 
inflation either today or tomorrow. In a sense, what makes default inevitable in some instances of fixed 
rates and fiscal laxity is that the central bank eventually abandons the peg to avoid a hyperinflation 
and/or deeper output decline. In other words, the monetary authority has access only to a limited 
commitment technology, where the limitation is a limitation in time.7 
 
The Dynamic Approach  
 
Several authors have challenged the traditional argument and suggested, instead, that a fixed 
exchange-rate regime may actually induce fiscal indiscipline (Tornell and Velasco, 1995, 1998; Sun, 
2003; and Duttagupta and Tolosa, 2006). In the presence of impatient policy-makers that heavily 
discount the future, the fact that the economic cost of fiscal indiscipline and default takes time to occur 
leads policy-makers to spend more today.8  
 
Where the traditional argument did not consider the relevance of time and how policy-makers 
discount the future, Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998) showed that if the economic costs of fiscal 
indiscipline were sufficiently delayed, then a fixed exchange rate regime would not limit the policy-
maker’s tendency to overspend. In their setup, policymakers completely discount the future and thus, 
under fixed exchange rates, they run reserves down through higher current spending. On the other 
 
5 See Bordo (2003) for a review on exchange rate regime adoption. 
6 Fiscal dominance occurs when monetary policy and inflation goals become hostage of fiscal policy dynamics. 
7 Limited commitment can be interpreted as a response to the need to keep government solvency, an optimal response 
given the cost of commitment, or both. The likelihood of this happening relates to what was termed “fiscal dominance.” 
8 For this intertemporal choice to be available to the policymaker, it is important that she either has sufficient reserves 
or access to credit. Otherwise, deficits would immediately lead to a currency depreciation. 
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hand, flexible exchange rates would bring immediate economic punishment to fiscal laxity through 
currency depreciation and higher inflation.9  
 
Sun (2003) developed a dynamic model integrating the traditional argument and Tornell and Velasco’s 
dynamic counterargument, showing how each one overemphasizes part of the story. According to her, 
the economic costs of fiscal indiscipline exist under both exchange-rate regimes. While in the short-
run fixed exchange rates shelter policy-makers from the consequences of lax fiscal policies, a higher 
future punishment, or a more balanced consideration of the future can induce fiscal discipline under 
fixed rates. However, given the temporally uneven structure of incentives under fixed exchange rate 
regimes, there is more of an incentive for lower expenditures under flexible exchange rate regimes.10 
 
A recent paper by Vuletin (2013) analyses the effects of capital controls on fiscal performance by 
focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. The author develops a model in which the fiscal policy is 
endogenously determined by a nonbenevolent fiscal authority, dual regimes induce politicians to have 
higher fiscal deficits than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. 
Panel regressions confirm that dual regimes lead to higher fiscal deficits than fixed and flexible regimes 
operating under unified rates. 
 
Political Economy Dimensions: Horizon and Cohesion 
 
In our view, existing models focus on the economic costs of fiscal indiscipline, but they do not carefully 
spell out the political dimension. 11 In particular, when these models discuss the time horizon of policy 
makers, they refer to how long it takes them to face economic disaster as a result of a fiscal crisis that 
would force their countries to abandon the currency peg. We think that in this time horizon, policy-
makers also take into account the distance to elections and the amount of time that they have been 
in government. This is because politicians are office-seekers rather than policy-seekers, and their prime 
objective is to maximize their probabilities of staying in power.12 In addition, policy-makers are forced 
to take into consideration the degree of political fragmentation they face when designing budget 
measures to be approved by parliament. In this context, we propose the introduction of an explicit 
electoral component in the policy-maker’s time horizon defined by Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998) 
and Sun (2003). In addition, we also propose the inclusion of a new political dimension, namely the 
 
9 Tornell and Velasco (1995, 1998) do not explicitly consider the trade-off between present and future punishment in 
fixed and flexible regimes, as they completely discount the future in the former case, and do not explicitly consider the 
future in the case of flexible rates. 
10 Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006) suggest a comparative model of fiscal policy for countries that either go alone or are 
integrated in a currency union. 
11 Schuknecht (1999) empirically studied the impact of fiscal policies around elections as affected by the exchange rate 
regime. Results showed that governments tried to improve their re-election prospects by expansionary fiscal policies, 
but only in countries with fixed exchange rates and adequate reserve levels.  
12 In political science, political parties are seen as primarily office-seeking or policy-seeking parties. Office-seeking 
parties maximize their control over political office benefits, while policy-seeking parties maximize their impact on 
public policy (for further analysis on this issue, see Muller and Strom, 1999). 
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degree of political cohesion. The two components of the revised theoretical framework can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
 Political Horizon – This dimension takes into account the time the policy-makers have before 
forthcoming elections - or regime change, in autocratic regimes. Politicians facing longer 
horizons have less of an incentive to overspend and thus associate with more fiscal discipline.  
 Political Cohesion: This dimension takes into account the number of political actors 
participating in budgetary decisions, which typically exhibit conflicting budgetary demands. 
These actors could be parties in government - or in opposition-, interest groups or, more 
generally, veto players. Politicians that operate in more cohesive political environments are 
likely to be subject to less stringent spending demands and be associated with tighter fiscal 
discipline. 
In this framework, strong politics—a long horizon for the policy-maker and a high cohesion of the 
political body—add credibility to a flexible exchange rate system, leading to fiscal discipline.13 The next 
section spells out these hypotheses formally in an illustrative model.  
  
III.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Consider an economy where there are two periods and three economic agents: a monetary authority, 
which decides the exchange rate; and two political players with authority over public spending.  
 
The central bank cares about the nominal exchange rate, E1, which it desires to be close to a target 
exchange rate, E*, in both periods. It also cares for output, Y, which it wishes to be as close as possible 
to a target level, Y*. This target level can be interpreted as potential output or some other desired 
reference level of output. The expression for the central bank’s loss function would be:  
 
𝐿 = ଵ
ଶ
∗ [(𝑌ଵ − 𝑌∗)ଶ + 𝑎ெ ∗ (𝐸ଵ − 𝐸∗)ଶ] + 𝛽ெ ∗
ଵ
ଶ
∗ [(𝑌ଶ − 𝑌∗)ଶ + 𝑎ெ ∗ (𝐸ଶ − 𝐸∗)ଶ]  (1) 
 
where 𝛽ெ  is the discount factor of the central banker, and 𝑎ெ  weighs the losses stemming from 
deviations in the exchange rate relative to losses from deviations in output. 𝑎ெ > 1, so that, given the 
central bank’s nature, deviations in the exchange rate are weighed more heavily than deviations in 
output. Output 𝑌ଵ and 𝑌ଶ are the weighted sum of the output of the two political constituencies, where 
the weights 𝛾ଵ and 𝛾ଶ sum up to 1. These weights accommodate a possible differentiated response of 
the central bank to the two political players.14 The central bank’s loss function would then become: 
 
13 Note that this paper does not aim to identify the political economy determinants of exchange rate regime choices. 
For a recent study on this topic please refer to Berdiev et al. (2012). The authors find we find that left-wing governments, 
democratic institutions, central bank independence and financial development increase the likelihood of choosing a 
flexible regime, whereas more globalized countries have a higher probability of implementing a fixed regime. 
14 Note that the central bank cares about both keeping the exchange rate stable and not having deep drops in output. 
Because higher borrowing levels by fiscal authorities would have a greater output cost, the central bank would thus 
react to debt increases by gradually accommodating them through currency depreciation. 
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𝐿 =
1
2
∗ ൤ቀ൫𝛾ଵ ∙ 𝑌ଵ,ଵ + 𝛾ଶ ∙ 𝑌ଶ,ଵ൯ − 𝑌∗ቁ
ଶ
+ 𝑎ெ ∗ (𝐸ଵ − 𝐸∗)ଶ൨ 
+𝛽ெ ∗
ଵ
ଶ
∗ ቂ൫(𝛾ଵ ∙ 𝑌ଵ,ଶ + 𝛾ଶ ∙ 𝑌ଶ,ଶ) − 𝑌∗൯
ଶ + 𝑎ெ ∗ (𝐸ଶ − 𝐸∗)ଶቃ  (2) 
 
where 𝑌ଵ,ଵ and 𝑌ଵ,ଶ stand respectively for the output of constituencies 1 and 2 in period 1, and 𝑌ଶ,ଵand 
𝑌ଶ,ଶ for their output in period 2.  
 
The fiscal players care only about their constituency’s output, and the higher it is the better for them. 
Consequently, the loss function of constituency 1 is represented by: 
 
𝐿ி೔ = − ln𝑌௜,ଵ − 𝛽ி ∗ ln𝑌௜,ଶ  (3) 
 
where 𝑌௜,ଵ and 𝑌௜,ଶhave been defined before, and 𝛽ி is the policymakers’ discount factor, which may be 
different than 𝛽ெ . The parameter 𝛽ி is a proxy for political horizon, so that its value is smaller the 
shorter the time horizon of the policymakers due to proximity of elections or other political factors 
(such as having been for a long time already in office). 
 
Output in period 1 and 2 positively depends on the exchange rate, respectively 𝐸ଵ  and 𝐸ଶ . The 
policymakers vie for transfers to their constituencies, 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଵ, and 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଶ, which increase output. However, 
these transfers have to be paid for in period 2, so that D = 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଵ + 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଶ. Debt is fully repaid in period 
2, and the debt burden is shared among the two constituencies according to weights 𝛼ଵ and 𝛼ଶ=1- 
𝛼ଵ, each greater than 0 and smaller than 1. Thus, output in periods 1 and 2 can be summarized as:  
 
൜
𝑌ଵ,ଵ = 𝑌∗ + 𝐸ଵ + 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଵ
𝑌ଶ,ଵ = 𝑌∗ + 𝐸ଵ + 𝑇𝑅𝐹ଶ
  (4) 
 
൜
𝑌ଵ,ଶ = 𝑌∗ + 𝐸ଶ − 𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝐷
𝑌ଶ,ଶ = 𝑌∗ + 𝐸ଶ − 𝛼ଶ ∙ 𝐷
  (5) 
 
In period 0, before the start of the game, the monetary authority sets a fixed exchange rate 𝐸ଵ. We do 
not endogenize the choice of the exchange rate in period 0. In period 1 the two political players engage 
in a fiscal game whereby each decides the degree of transfers that goes to their own constituency. The 
deterrent to spending “too much” in period 1 is the fact that transfers, which increase utility in period 
1, also increase debt which will have to be fully repaid in period 2 and thus decrease utility in period 
2. How much each fiscal policymaker engages in transfers today depends on the amount of future 
debt that they will have to repay in the future. In period 2, as the central bank cares for output as well 
as for the exchange rate, it will default on the exchange rate. But the extent to which the central bank 
will accommodate fiscal profligacy depends on 𝑎ெ , and the policymakers take that factor into 
consideration. 
 
There are two key political economy parameters that affect the degree of indebtedness. The first factor 
affecting indebtedness is the political Horizon, that is, the extent to which the fiscal policymakers value 
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the future. This is related to electoral and other incentives that may make the policymaker less 
responsive to the future consequences of indebtedness. When the political horizon is longer, 
policymakers value the decrease in utility tomorrow due to debt repayment relatively more than the 
current increase in utility, driven by transfers. And the second factor affecting indebtedness is the 
degree of political Cohesion, which is a function of the share of debt to be repaid by each fiscal actor 
in period 2. When each political actor is responsible for 50 percent of debt repayment, the political 
system is more cohesive, and both policymakers behave responsibly in fiscal terms.  
 
We now solve the model by backward induction. We first determine what is the rate of devaluation 
chosen in period 2, by the central banker, for each level of indebtedness. In other words, in period 2 
the central bank decides how much debt to accommodate through devaluation. As a result, the central 
bank’s reaction function to debt accumulation is the following: 
 
𝐸ଶ =
௔ಾ∗ா∗ା஽∗(ఈభ∙ఊభାఈమ∙ఊమ)
ଵା௔ಾ
  (6) 
 
As expected, the higher the debt incurred in period 1 by the policymakers, the higher the exchange 
rate depreciation by the central bank, in period 2. Also as expected, the combination of parameters 
associated with D shows that the accommodation is less than one for one, as 𝑎ெ > 1, and (𝛼ଵ ∙ 𝛾ଵ +
𝛼ଶ ∙ 𝛾ଶ) generally smaller than 1. The higher 𝑎ெ that is, the more averse is the central bank to exchange 
rate deviations the less it accommodates debt. Further, as 𝑎ெ increases to infinity, 𝐸ଶ tends to E* and 
there is no debt accommodation whatsoever. This is the case of a fully credible and unchangeable 
fixed exchange rate. 
 
Working backwards, in period 1 the policymakers take into consideration the behaviour of the 
central bank and each constituency’s share of the debt burden to decide how much transfers to 
mobilize. Total transfers - and thus debt, one period later – are given by the intersection of two fiscal 
reaction functions where each constituency’s level of transfers depends on the others’, as below: 
 
𝑇𝑅𝐹ଵ = −
௒∗ା௔ಾ∙(ா∗ା௒∗)
ଶ∗൫ఈమ∙ఊమିఈభ∙(௔ಾିఊభାଵ)൯
− 𝛽ி ∙
(ாభା௒∗)
ଶ
− ்ோிమ
ଶ
  (7) 
 
𝑇𝑅𝐹ଶ = −
௒∗ା௔ಾ∙(ா∗ା௒∗)
ଶ∗൫ఈభ∙ఊభିఈమ∙(௔ಾିఊమାଵ)൯
− 𝛽ி ∙
(ாభା௒∗)
ଶ
− ்ோிభ
ଶ
  (8)  
 
 
An increase in transfers to a specific constituency by 1 monetary unit leads to a decrease in transfers 
by the other player by less than one unit. Thus, an equilibrium exists. Below, we present to figures to 
illustrate the two main political economy propositions that can be derived from this model. Other 
things being equal: 
 
Proposition 1: An decrease in the discount factor, 𝛽ி , of the fiscal policy-makers so that they act 
under a longer political Horizon, leads to lower indebtedness (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Political Horizon and Indebtedness 
  
Note: A lower discount of the future (i.e., higher political Horizon) leads to lower indebtedness (i.e., more fiscal 
discipline). 
 
 
Proposition 2: An increase in political Cohesion, expressed by a more even distribution of the debt 
burden between political constituencies, leads to a decrease in public debt (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Political Cohesion and Indebtedness 
 
 
Note: A higher level of burden sharing (i.e., higher political Cohesion) leads lower indebtedness (i.e., more fiscal 
discipline). 
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IV.    EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
Data Description   
 
To test the propositions above, we use an unbalanced panel of 79 countries, including 31 advanced 
countries and 48 emerging and low income economies, between the years of 1975 and 2012, to 
estimate the following specification: 
 
 itititititittiit POLERPOLERFD   )*('   (9) 
 
where itFD is our proxy for fiscal discipline, given by the primary balance, measured in percent of 
GDP;15 itER is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when a country is under a fixed exchange rate 
regime and 0 if under a flexible exchange rate regime;16 it' , which is a vector of control variables 
expected to affect the fiscal policy stance comprised of: the real GDP growth rate, trade openness 
(exports plus imports as share of GDP), terms of trade, log of total reserves, in USD, private credit, in 
percent of % GDP, and CPI inflation rate.17 The parameters ti  , are country and time effects and aim 
at capturing unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time-unvarying factors. it is a white noise 
iid disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions of zero mean and constant variance. Finally, 
itPOL accounts for political factors, which will be constructed using Principal Component Analysis - 
hereafter PCA, to obtain the common factor(s) of each block of variables comprising two components 
we termed Horizon and Cohesion. These are defined as follows: 
 
 Political Horizon: a longer political horizon is associated with less years in office, more years 
left in current term, a party of chief executive with a long tradition in office, more months to 
next election.18 Only the first principal component is retained.19 
 
15 Source: IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
16 We use the classification of exchange rate regimes provided by Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) and generate a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 (fixed exchange rate) if the country/year observation has any value between 1 and 8 in the 
Reinhart and Rogoff’s classification, and takes value zero otherwise – original Reinhart and Rogoff’s values of 9 to 15. 
We also test the robustness of our results by generating another dummy variable that uses Coarse’s classification from 
the IMF. 
17 This is in line with Duttagupta and Tolosa (2006). 
18 This latter indicator refers to actual months left to next election, ex-post facto, after the fact, while the variable 
“more years left in current term” is observed ex-ante. Both are informative.  
19  A likelihood ratio (LR) test was used to examine the “sphericity” case, allowing for sampling variability in the 
correlations. This test comfortably rejects sphericity at the 1% level. The first factor explains almost 40% of the variance 
in the standardized data (see Table 2). 
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 Political Cohesion: a stronger political cohesion is associated with a high margin of the 
parliamentary majority supporting the cabinet, low cabinet fragmentation, executive control of 
all houses, and a weak opposition. Only the first principal component is retained. 
Horizon and Cohesion variables are each represented by one factor composed of four underlying 
variables.20 The resulting principal components indices are described in Table 1, while Table 2 lists the 
corresponding factor loadings.21 We can interpret the principal components by focusing on the factor 
loadings and the uniqueness of each variable.22 As regards political Horizon, uniqueness is relatively 
low for all variables, which implies that the factor retained spans the original variables adequately. As 
to political Cohesion, the factor appears to describe mostly the margin of majority and cabinet strength. 
In principle, both factors should enter with positive coefficients in the regressions. 
 
A first look at the data shows that in line with the findings of Tornell and Velasco (1995) and Sun (2003), 
fiscal discipline is lower under fixed exchange regimes than under flexible ones (see Figure 3). Also, 
stylized facts seem to confirm the propositions of the theoretical model presented above: in contexts 
of long political Horizon, the average primary surplus was only 0.01 percent of GDP under fixed 
exchange rate regimes and it reached up to 0.3 percent of GDP under flexible exchange rates. These 
differences were smaller in contexts of high political Cohesion. In this case, the average primary deficit 
was -0.2 percent of GDP under fixed exchange rates and slightly better, at -0.1 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Political Composite Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Concept  Average Standard deviation Variables 
Horizon 0 1 years in office 
  years left in current term 
  party of chief executive more time in office 
  months to next election 
Cohesion 0 1 margin of majority   
cabinet strength 
  executive control of all houses 
  weak opposition 
 
 
 
20 The sources for each component variable are the Database on Political Institutions (DPI, 2015). 
21 PCA is based on the classical covariance matrix, which is sensitive to outliers. Here we conduct a robust estimation of 
the covariance matrix. A well suited method is the Minimum Covariance Determinant (MCD) that considers all subsets 
containing h % of the observations and estimates the variance of the mean on the data of the subset associated with 
the smallest covariance matrix determinant. Specifically, we implement the Rousseeuw and Van Driessen's (1999) 
algorithm. When we computed the same indices with the MCD version, we obtained similar results, suggesting that 
outliers are not driving our factor analysis. 
22 Uniqueness of a variable is the share of its variance that is not accounted by all the factors. 
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Table 2. Factor Loadings and Uniqueness 
Variables Factors Uniqueness 
 horizon cohesion  
years in office 0.39  0.29 
years left in current term 0.41  0.28 
party of chief executive more time in office 0.37  0.29 
months to next election 0.45  0.28 
margin of majority  0.93 0.12 
cabinet strength  0.90 0.17 
executive control of all houses  0.76 0.42 
weak opposition  0.72 0.47 
% explained 0.39 0.69  
 
 
Figure 3. Primary Balance, Exchange Rates, and Political Conditions 
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Baseline Panel Results 
 
Firstly, we estimate equation (9) using ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedastic and serial 
correlation robust standard errors clustered at the country level. We also use alternative estimators 
that correct for the standard econometric pitfalls, including possible reverse causality between 
exchange rate regimes and the fiscal stance, or a potential problem of omitted variable bias affecting 
simultaneously both the choice of the exchange rate regime and the fiscal stance. In order to correct 
for serial correlation and possible cross-sectional heteroskedasticity we run Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) using estimated cross-section residual variances as weights, thus attaining a more 
efficient estimate than under OLS. 
 
Secondly, having in mind potential cross-sectional dependencies, we also run our main regression 
equation (9) with Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. This non-parametric technique assumes 
the error structure to be heteroskedastic, autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated 
between the groups. 
 
Thirdly, as a closer inspection of the data suggests, influential outliers potentially play a role in cross-
section analysis. It is important to consider how much outliers drive our results, particularly in such a 
heterogeneous sample as ours, which includes emerging market and low income economies 
characterized by spells of exchange rate volatility. We use the Method of Moments that fits the efficient 
high breakdown estimator proposed by Yokai (1987).23  
The model described by equation (9) is a reduced-form and therefore it does not legitimize causal 
statements or even immediate quantification of the effect of exchange rate regimes and politics on 
fiscal discipline. As causality can run in both directions, some of the right-hand-side regressors may be 
correlated with the error term. We complement our fixed-effects approach with a panel Instrumental 
Variable-Generalised Least Squares (IV-GLS) approach. As instruments, the main variables used are 
those proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Fatàs and Mihov (2013). The first instrument - labelled 
‘constraints’, captures potential veto points on the decisions of the executive. A variation of our 
measure of constraints is a variable constructed by Henisz (2000) called ‘political constraints’ (labelled 
‘polcon’). This variable differs from our measure in two ways: (1) the author adjusts for the ideological 
alignment across political institutions; and (2) he argues that each additional constraint has a 
diminishing marginal effect on policy outcomes and therefore the link between the overall measure 
and the veto points should be nonlinear. In addition, we use dummies to control for the presence of 
expenditure, taxes and debt rules.  
 
Our first set of results concerns the estimation of equation (9) to test empirically Propositions 1, 2 from 
the theoretical section. We start by analysing independently the variables that measure the exchange 
rate regime, political Horizon and the political Cohesion. In Table 3 we observe that the estimates of 
 
23 In the first stage it takes the S estimator, a high breakdown value method introduced in Rousseeuw and Yohai (1984) 
applied to the residual scale. It then derives starting values for the coefficient vectors, and on the second stage applies 
the Huber-type bi-square M-estimator using iteratively re-weighted least squares (IRWLS) to obtain the final coefficient 
estimates. 
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the coefficient associated with the fixed exchange rate regime is always negative and almost always 
statistically significant at conventional levels. These results are in line with the latest findings in the 
empirical literature: being in or moving to a fixed exchange rate regime is associated with less fiscal 
discipline. Also, theoretical Propositions 1 and 2 are confirmed empirically as well. A longer political 
Horizon and more political Cohesion are both associated with a higher primary balance and more fiscal 
discipline. The rest of the controls are usually statistically significant and with the expected sign: higher 
GDP growth, higher inflation, higher reserves, better terms of trade and trade and financial openness 
are all associated with higher fiscal discipline.24 
 
Table 3. Baseline, Fixed Effects Regressions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Fixed ER -0.432** -0.412** -0.366* -0.388* -0.406* -0.472** -0.370 
 (0.180) (0.192) (0.219) (0.230) (0.215) (0.226) (0.234) 
Growth 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.116*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
Trade Openness 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Terms Of Trade 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Reserves 0.438*** 0.410*** 0.451*** 0.398*** 0.271*** 0.217** 0.226** 
 (0.093) (0.093) (0.108) (0.101) (0.099) (0.102) (0.107) 
Inflation  0.034***   0.024** 0.030*** 0.027*** 
  (0.011)   (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Financial 
Openness 
  0.017*     
   (0.009)     
Credit    0.045***    
    (0.013)    
Horizon      0.346***  0.310*** 
     (0.096)  (0.116) 
Cohesion       0.241* 0.241 
      (0.142) (0.164) 
Observations 2,404 2,216 1,888 1,779 1,808 1,560 1,456 
R-squared 0.442 0.456 0.476 0.471 0.486 0.478 0.478 
Note: Estimation with country and time effects (omitted for reasons of parsimony). Robust standard errors clustered 
at the country level in parenthesis. Constant term estimated by omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
In Table 4 we include two interaction terms between the dummy variable for fixed exchange rate 
regimes and the two variables that measure political Horizon and Cohesion. Again, we obtain a 
statistically significant and negative estimate of the coefficient on fixed exchange rate regimes and 
positive coefficients for both political indicators. Interestingly, the interaction terms between the key 
variables are negative suggesting that the positive effect of politics (longer Horizon or higher Cohesion) 
on the degree of fiscal discipline are particularly relevant for flexible exchange rate regimes. In other 
words, it is in flexible exchange rate settings that politics seems to matter most. 
 
 
24 For reasons of parsimony, for the remainder of the paper we refrain from commenting on the controls. 
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Note that these results shed light on the questions that motivate this paper. In line with our model´s 
prediction, both exchange rates and politics matter for fiscal discipline. In line with our model’s 
prediction, flexible (not fixed) exchange rates, and strong politics (long horizon and high cohesion) are 
both associated with better fiscal positions. The exchange rate regime seems to be quantitatively more 
important than the underlying political conditions. When considered together, strong politics 
attenuate the damaging effects of fixed rates on fiscal discipline, but are insufficient to reverse fiscal 
profligacy. Moreover, the positive effects of longer political horizon and more political cohesion on 
fiscal performance are amplified under flexible exchange rate regimes.  
 
Table 4. Interaction Terms, Fixed Effects Regressions 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fixed ER -0.637*** -0.826*** -0.720*** -0.547** -0.696*** -0.589** 
 (0.208) (0.236) (0.263) (0.214) (0.262) (0.267) 
Growth 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.135*** 0.117*** 0.135*** 0.145*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) 
Trade Openness 0.025*** 0.014** 0.016** 0.022*** 0.011* 0.012* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Terms Of Trade 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Reserves 0.260*** 0.208** 0.214** 0.273*** 0.207** 0.224** 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.103) (0.099) (0.102) (0.107) 
Horizon 0.534***  0.451*** 0.519***  0.433*** 
 (0.114)  (0.144) (0.117)  (0.148) 
Horizon*Fixed ER -0.435***  -0.308 -0.417**  -0.278 
 (0.167)  (0.225) (0.171)  (0.233) 
Cohesion   0.370** 0.288  0.364** 0.296 
  (0.169) (0.181)  (0.175) (0.181) 
Cohesion*Fixed ER  -0.397* -0.178  -0.343 -0.146 
  (0.231) (0.287)  (0.259) (0.294) 
Inflation    0.024** 0.029*** 0.027*** 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 1,904 1,655 1,534 1,808 1,560 1,456 
R-squared 0.485 0.470 0.472 0.488 0.478 0.479 
Note: Estimation with country and time effects (omitted for reasons of parsimony). Robust standard errors clustered at 
the country level in parenthesis. Constant term estimated by omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
V.   ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Sensitivity to alternative estimators, outliers and endogeneity 
 
To test the robustness of our baseline results, we perform a series of robustness checks. First, we re-
estimate equation (9) using FGLS, Driscroll-Kraay cross-sectional dependence-robust standard errors 
and also the MM-estimator to check for outliers. Results in Table 5 show again that fixed exchange 
rates are associated with less fiscal discipline, while a longer Horizon (and higher Cohesion 25  is 
 
25 Results for Cohesion are available from the authors upon request. 
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associated with better fiscal performance. The interaction terms between the key variables are also 
negative and significant. Secondly, we estimate regressions using instrumental variables to address 
endogeneity concerns. Results are reported in Table 6 and confirm the baseline set of findings.  
 
Table 5. Sensitivity to Alternative Estimators 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Estimator FGLS FGLS FGLS Driscroll-
Kraay 
Driscroll-
Kraay 
Driscroll-
Kraay 
Outlier-
robust 
Outlier-
robust 
Outlier-
robust 
 Fixed ER -0.579*** -0.635*** -0.686*** -0.662*** -0.812*** -0.956*** -0.540*** -0.476* -0.601** 
 (0.164) (0.181) (0.181) (0.240) (0.267) (0.277) (0.207) (0.269) (0.259) 
 Growth 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.160*** 0.182*** 0.192*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.041) (0.048) (0.048) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) 
 Trade 
Openness 
0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Terms Of 
Trade 
0.008*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.004 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
 Reserves -0.026 -0.004 -0.005 0.189 0.124 0.125 0.379*** 0.420*** 0.407*** 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.073) (0.191) (0.204) (0.205) (0.044) (0.055) (0.056) 
 Inflation  0.041*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.476*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.056) 
 Horizon  0.215*** 0.315***  0.344*** 0.521***  0.013 0.285 
  (0.059) (0.072)  (0.106) (0.129)  (0.158) (0.185) 
 
Horizon*Fixed 
ER 
  -0.247**   -0.423***   -0.631** 
   (0.111)   (0.157)   (0.266) 
          
 Observations 2,214 1,807 1,807 2,216 1,808 1,808 2,216 1,808 1,808 
Note: Estimation by either Feasible Generalized Least Squares, or Driscroll-Kraay cross-sectional dependence-robust 
standard errors or MM-estimator for outliers, as identified in the second row. Country and time effects omitted for 
reasons of parsimony. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. Constant term estimated 
by omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Endogeneity: Instrumental Variables 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimator IV IV IV IV IV 
Fixed ER -0.730*** -0.743*** -0.888*** -0.754*** -0.873*** 
 (0.203) (0.217) (0.227) (0.225) (0.303) 
Growth 0.208*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Trade Openness 0.008* 0.010** 0.011** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Terms Of Trade 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Reserves 0.088 0.064 0.066 0.231*** 0.229*** 
 (0.073) (0.078) (0.077) (0.087) (0.087) 
Inflation  0.035* 0.029 0.029 0.036* 0.036* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Horizon  0.365*** 0.536***   
  (0.111) (0.136)   
Horizon*Fixed ER   -0.431**   
   (0.200)   
Cohesion     0.133 0.190 
    (0.196) (0.218) 
Cohesion*Fixed 
ER 
    -0.175 
     (0.297) 
Observations 1,872 1,634 1,634 1,396 1,396 
Note: Estimation by instrumental variable, as identified in the second row. Country and time effects omitted for 
reasons of parsimony. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. Instruments include: 
constraints on the executive and political constraints – see text for more details. Constant term estimated by omitted. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
Sensitivity to an alternative definition of the dependent variable 
 
We also test the robustness of our results to a different definition of the dependent variable, by 
identifying fiscal discipline with strong improvements in the fiscal stance associated with fiscal 
consolidations. The dependent variable is now a dummy taking the value 1 during years of fiscal 
consolidation. The literature addressing the identification of fiscal adjustment episodes is vast and has 
relied on changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) as a share of GDP. Some caveats 
surrounding this approach have been highlighted recently.26 To maximize country coverage, we rely 
on Alesina and Ardagna´s (1998) method of identifying fiscal adjustments. They consider the change 
in the CAPB that is at least 2 percentage points of GDP in one year or at least 1.5 percentage points 
on average in the last two years. 
 
26 In particular, the CAPB approach could bias empirical estimates towards finding evidence of non-Keynesian effects 
(see, e.g.,, Afonso and Jalles, 2014). Many non-policy factors influence the CAPB and can lead to erroneous conclusions 
regarding fiscal policy changes. For example, a stock price boom raises the CAPB by increasing capital gains tax revenue, 
and tends to coincide with an expansion in private demand (Morris and Schuknecht, 2007). Even when the CAPB 
accurately measures fiscal actions these include discretionary responses to economic developments. 
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Since we now have a dependent variable that is expressed in binary terms, we employ a logistic 
regression to estimate equation (1). More precisely, we estimate the following model:27 
 
 Prob(FD 1|ER,X) ( ' ),i ER POL       X   (10) 
where , , ,    are vectors of the parameters to be estimated and ( .)  is the logistic function.28 
 
Given that we rely on panel data, the structural model can be written as: 
 
*
it
*
it it
FD ' ,
FD 1  if  FD 0,  and 0 otherwise.
i it itER POL        
 
X
    (11) 
 
with i = 1, …, 78; t = 1980, …, 2013; i  captures the unobserved individual effects; and it is the error 
term. 
 
We take the analysis one step further and also assume that a fiscal adjustment is successful (SU) if the 
improvement in the cyclically adjusted primary budget balances for two consecutive years is at least 
η-times the standard deviation of the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in the full panel (see 
Afonso and Jalles, 2012): 
 
1
0
1,
0,
t i
i
if b
otherwise


  


      (12) 
 
In our analysis we use a threshold value of η=1. 
 
Our results suggest that fixed exchange rate regimes decrease the likelihood of a given government 
engaging in a fiscal consolidation.29 More importantly, the likelihood is even smaller if we restrict our 
sample to successful fiscal episodes, as shown by the higher magnitude - in absolute value, of the 
estimated coefficients in columns 6 to 10. The Horizon of the policy-makers is never relevant, in line 
with results in Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), which find that engaging in fiscal adjustments does 
not increase the likelihood of cabinet turnover. In this setting, political Cohesion becomes statistically 
 
27 For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2012, Ch. 17). 
28 As probit models do not render themselves well to the fixed-effects treatment due to the incidental parameter 
problem (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 15, p. 484), we estimate a logit model with fixed-effects. 
29 As a robustness check to Alesina and Ardagna’s (1998) method we employed alternatively Giavazzi and Pagano’s 
(1996). They propose using the cumulative changes in the CAPB that are at least 5, 4, 3 percentage points of GDP in 
respectively 4, 3 or 2 years, or 3 percentage points in one year. Results, available upon request, did not qualitatively 
change. 
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irrelevant, as the interaction term between Cohesion and exchange rate regime loses statistical 
significance. 
 
Table 7. Discretionary Fiscal Consolidations as Proxy for Fiscal Discipline: Logit Estimations 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Consolidation 
approach 
All Fiscal Consolidations Successful Fiscal Consolidations 
Fixed ER -0.405*** -0.587*** -0.526*** -0.482*** -0.607* -1.173** -1.720*** -1.631** -1.797*** -3.353* 
 (0.149) (0.165) (0.181) (0.176) (0.314) (0.556) (0.646) (0.665) (0.649) (1.877) 
Growth 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.033 -0.033 0.292*** 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.285** 0.293** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.102) (0.119) (0.120) (0.135) (0.137) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.005* 0.004 0.004 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.037** -0.066*** -0.065*** -0.068* -0.067* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.039) (0.039) 
Terms of Trade -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.086** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.081* -0.080* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.048) (0.048) 
Reserves 0.148** 0.086 0.089 0.097 0.093 -0.629* -1.103*** -1.078*** -0.204 -0.226 
 (0.072) (0.078) (0.078) (0.087) (0.088) (0.346) (0.403) (0.395) (0.459) (0.471) 
Horizon   0.098 0.028    0.046 0.219   
  (0.100) (0.134)    (0.277) (0.527)   
Horizon*Fixed 
ER 
  0.149     0.239   
   (0.181)     (0.584)   
Cohesion     0.782*** 0.737***    0.723 0.017 
    (0.189) (0.207)    (0.888) (1.607) 
Cohesion*Fixed 
ER 
    -0.155     -1.553 
     (0.342)     (1.777) 
           
Observations 985 857 857 764 764 136 134 134 100 100 
Note: Logit estimation. Binary type dependent variable identified in the second row. Constant term estimated by 
omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
We have also tried an alternative dependent variable by using fiscal discipline defined in nominal levels 
(instead of percent of GDP) and in real per capita terms. Results, available in Table A1 in the Appendix, 
confirm our findings. 
Sensitivity to an alternative measure of Exchange Rate Regime 
 
We also test the robustness of our empirical exercise to a different measure of the exchange rate 
regime. Instead of building the dummy variable using a normative classification of exchange rate 
systems from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), we use a positive approach. Now, the new dummy variable 
𝐸𝑅௜௧௡௘௪ takes value 1 - denoting a fixed exchange rate regime, if the 5-year rolling volatility of the real 
effective exchange rate is smaller than 1/3 of the 5-year rolling average volatility.30 Results shown in 
Table 8 suggest that our new definition of fixed exchange regimes (Fixed ER-new) still yields negative 
 
30 Volatility is measured by the standard deviation. Note that changing the threshold slightly above or below 1/3 does 
not change results. 
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and, when Cohesion is controlled for, statistically significant coefficients when explaining the degree 
of fiscal discipline.  
Table 8. Robustness to Alternative Definition of ER Regime 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed ER-new -0.515 -0.515 -0.952*** -0.907** 
 (0.356) (0.356) (0.356) (0.358) 
Growth 0.233*** 0.233*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Trade Openness -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Terms Of Trade 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Reserves 0.226 0.223 0.335** 0.349*** 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.133) (0.133) 
Horizon  0.301** 0.312**   
 (0.135) (0.139)   
Horizon* Fixed 
ER-new 
 -0.230   
  (0.369)   
Cohesion    0.992*** 1.044*** 
   (0.259) (0.261) 
Cohesion*Fixed 
ER-new 
   -0.852* 
    (0.440) 
     
Observations 1,033 1,033 976 976 
R-squared 0.560 0.561 0.561 0.562 
Note: Estimation with country and time effects (omitted for reasons of parsimony). Robust standard errors clustered 
at the country level in parenthesis. Constant term estimated by omitted. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper we present both theoretical and empirical evidence showing that, contrary to the 
traditional argument, flexible (not fixed) exchange rate regimes are associated with more fiscal 
discipline. The fiscal implications of exchange rate regime choice do not occur in a vacuum, but within 
a specific political context. By bringing politics into the picture, this paper contributes to the literature 
by carefully uncovering how the exchange rate regime interacts with the political context to affect 
fiscal policy outcomes. Our results draw on the longest and widest cross-section of country experiences 
available. We find that strong political environments characterized by long Horizon and high Cohesion 
among policy-makers (i.e., where elections are not imminent and where there is little political 
fragmentation) are associated with better fiscal performance.31  
 
 
31 In a recent paper making use of a laboratory experiment, Battaglini, Nunnari and Palfrey (2016) find evidence that 
more inclusive requirements for fiscal decision and more vulnerability to shocks (which we can equate to longer 
horizons) are associated with lower debt accumulation. 
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Our results offer important policy lessons from the point of view of fiscal policy making. First, if 
policymakers operate in weak political contexts, flexible exchange rates are the preferred option as 
they are best suited to secure enhanced fiscal discipline. Second, the virtuous effect of flexible 
exchange rates on fiscal discipline can be maximized by strong political environments, characterized 
by long political horizon and high political cohesion. Third, in mixed political contexts policy-makers 
face a difficult choice as moving to a fixed exchange rate regime may negatively impact fiscal 
performance in a way that political institutions are unable to attenuate. 
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APPENDIX 1. ROBUSTNESS 
Table A1. Robustness to Alternative Measures of Fiscal Discipline 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dep. Variable Nominal Primary Balance Real Primary Balance per capita 
Fixed ER -0.926*** -0.385 -0.424 -0.618* -0.233 -0.881*** -0.369 -0.411 -0.603* -0.206 
 (0.316) (0.301) (0.338) (0.393) (0.369) (0.313) (0.298) (0.335) (0.389) (0.366) 
Growth -0.006 0.030 0.030 0.042 0.041 -0.005 0.030 0.030 0.043 0.042 
 (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.036) 
Trade Openness -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Terms Of Trade -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Reserves 0.625*** 0.460*** 0.462*** 0.832*** 0.840*** 0.592*** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.813*** 0.821*** 
 (0.138) (0.114) (0.114) (0.152) (0.152) (0.137) (0.113) (0.113) (0.150) (0.151) 
Horizon   -0.154 -0.121    -0.149 -0.114   
  (0.104) (0.140)    (0.104) (0.139)   
Horizon*Fixed ER   -0.088     -0.093   
   (0.202)     (0.201)   
Cohesion     0.909*** 0.746**    0.943*** 0.775** 
    (0.291) (0.307)    (0.288) (0.304) 
Cohesion*Fixed 
ER 
    0.566     0.584 
     (0.387)     (0.383) 
           
Observations 1,121 896 896 800 800 1,121 896 896 800 800 
R-squared 0.740 0.762 0.762 0.737 0.738 0.741 0.756 0.756 0.736 0.737 
Note: Dependent variable identified in second row. Estimation with country and time effects (omitted for reasons of 
parsimony). Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parenthesis. Constant term estimated by omitted. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
